Experience of the second Chechen war on the Ukrainian front: pacification of the society and impunity for the criminals

In the 1990s Chechens in Poland (and in Central and Eastern Europe) were extremely popular. The name of their nation was synonymous with a relentless fight against Russian imperialism. Leaders such as Dzhohar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov were regarded in many countries as romantic heroes challenging the mighty Moscow. For those who may not remember those times, this may come as a surprise, because today the Chechens are considered to be exceptionally loyal towards the Russian authorities, and their president Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be one of the most devoted politicians with respect to Putin.

In order to understand how this metamorphosis was achieved, one must go back to October 1999, when the second Chechen war began. At that time the people of Chechnya, having concluded the Khasavyurt truce three years earlier, enjoyed considerable autonomy within the Russian Federation. And it was at that time that four residential houses on Russian territory exploded, killing around 300 people. Today we know that the FSB, the successor to the KGB, was responsible for this action and wanted to blame the Chechens for the attacks. The provocation was successful and resulted in a war, which became part of the presidential campaign of the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Punitive expedition

That war had a huge impact on Putin not only because it brought him to power, but also because it had shown him an effective model for dealing with rebellious nations. It was able to turn revolting peoples into obedient servants of the empire, anti-Russian partisans into the Kremlin’s own loyal guards.

This was no ordinary war campaign, but a punitive expedition. It involved mass atrocities, namely, the extermination of local elites and pro-independence elements. Those who were suspected of resentment towards Russia were kidnapped, tortured, raped and murdered. The total terror spread horror and paralysed the will to resist. In this way the spirit of the Chechens was broken within a few years.

There is much to suggest that the same methods were planned in Ukraine to pacify the local population. Proscription lists containing the names of politicians and activists to be eliminated, the extermination of the civilian population in Bucza and other occupied towns, and texts such as Timofey Sergeyev’s manifesto announcing a ruthless crackdown on Ukraine’s ‘Nazi elite’ testify to the reality of such a scenario.

Today, the commanders of Russian armies and divisions in Ukraine are generals that often gained their first military experience as lieutenants or captains during the Second Chechen War. They were the ones who carried out the atrocities, terrorising the local population and murdering defenceless civilians and prisoners of war. They too - like Putin - know from their own experience that this is a model that works in occupied territory, because it allows the conquered population to be tamed. And even more: it allows the empire’s enemies to be turned into its servants. And that, after all, was the aim of the whole operation: to establish a ‘Russky mir’ in which Ukraine would become a loyal member of the Russian world.

Putin and his commanders have learned another lesson from the second Chechen war - that the crimes of war remain completely unpunished. That you can commit genocide and the world won’t react. Or if it does react, it will do so only symbolically, and then it simply forgets and goes back to doing its own business. Will a similar lesson also be drawn from the war in Ukraine?

Tłum. K.J.