There was no earthquake, no sensations. Fidesz has won for the fourth time running. It has won high, unequivocally, indisputably. More strongly than predicted just a few dozen hours ago. It has won an independent majority, although this time probably not a constitutional majority.

Fidesz’s security-oriented message, proclaiming that „the elections will decide about war or peace”, proved effective. The opposition, which proclaimed that „this is our war”, failed to work the miracle. Also because its campaign was at times pathetic: chaotic, multithreaded, and very emotional and at the same time very vague, lacking depth of vision, charisma and, in the end, energy. There was no clear, credible economic and social proposal; instead it focused on ideological and identity issues, important for the metropolitan elite, but not necessarily for millions of voters. There were many speakers at the rallies, each placing the emphasis on something different. The candidate for Prime Minister, Péter Márki-Zay, would have been an interesting publicist or a popular presenter, but due to his lack of experience, sophistication and discipline, he did not stand much of a chance against a politician as experienced as Viktor Orbán, and there are indications that he may not even win in his own constituency. All the more so as Fidesz’s well-oiled political machine has once again proved to be very efficient.

Fidesz wins thanks to the votes of the provinces, greatly motivated by a clear, legible message and substantial material support - also in the form of various development programmes. It fails in Budapest. The situation is very similar to what we see in Poland, except that the standing of the Hungarian governing party is stronger in medium-sized cities than that of the Law and Justice party in such places.

In the last few hours, the Hungarian media, and not just the right-wing ones, have abundantly and frequently quoted President Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s statement for the ‘Sieci’ newspaper, in which he announced further cooperation with Hungary - despite obvious differences with regard to Russia and Ukraine. Politically, it was a very important statement, which was welcomed with relief by a large part of Fidesz politicians and voters. It was, as one ruling party analyst put it, „a big boost for our morale”.

Clearly, against this background, the question is whether the new Hungarian Government formed after the elections will correct its foreign policy. This seems very likely. It is possible that the trade and foreign ministries, which are currently headed by Péter Szijjártó, will be separated; he would keep trade and diplomacy would be run by someone with an explicitly pro-Atlantic orientation. The Russian aggression against Ukraine clearly took Budapest by surprise; up to the end it seemed to think that the military build-up around Ukraine’s borders was just a demonstration. They also did not trust the signals coming from Poland. It turned out that we were right this time.

The other thing is that Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s success for Poland means that Warsaw will still be able to rely on Budapest - and vice versa - in the battle for sovereignty within the European Union. The war has somewhat obscured these issues, but certainly not for long. Centralising tendencies shall not disappear. The Polish opposition will also carefully analyse the Hungarian experience in 2022. Since the concept of uniting all forces that are not in favour of the government failed in Hungary, it is hard to expect that it will succeed in Poland. The other thing is that the Hungarian law - in fact a majority law - forced the widest possible agreement. Our d’Hondt, however, gives more room for manoeuvre, in fact to both sides.

In the last week of the campaign, the pro-government media also highlighted a statement made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski, who strongly attacked Prime Minister Orban during the EU summit in Brussels, evoking, among other things, the crimes of the Hungarian Nazis at the end of World War II by referring to a characteristic monument to the victims (shoes on the bank of the Danube). Zelenski wanted to help the opposition, with whom he has connections, but unwittingly helped Fidesz by mobilising its electoral base. This was also because Hungarian-Ukrainian relations have been difficult for years. The source of the strain is the issue of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, which, according to Budapest, is even being persecuted by the authorities in Kiev.

Next to Poland, Hungary is today the most important country that is trying to follow a different path from the one dictated by the instructions pouring in from Brussels. It is pursuing - with success - a policy supporting the family, defending traditional values, and has dragged the country out of the catastrophe of post-Communist rule. As in every country, they have their share of problems, scandals and troubles of various sorts, but the European political landscape would certainly be considerably poorer if the local opposition came to power, and on the whole it would be very similar to what we know so well from our own Polish experience. For Poland, the results of the vote are a good omen, proving that left-liberal pressure can be successfully resisted.

Using a well-known metaphor: the train that has left Budapest is a good omen for the Polish elections in 2023. But also an important hint. Because Fidesz wins not thanks to radical policies, and not thanks to some miraculous tricks. It wins above all thanks to its steadfast consistence in key areas.