“Poland is preparing for World War III”, “Poland is set to wage a war against Belarus”, “So much for the sovereignty of Poland”, “Poland will serve as a training ground for US and Russian nukes”, “Polish threat to Russia has been on the rise”, “Polish army is in a bad condition”, “Both morale and level of training of Polish soldiers are low”

— this is just a sample of narratives pushed in recent months by the Russian media, but also by news websites spreading pro-Russian propaganda in Poland. For a couple of years now, in the Polish media environment an increased presence of entities undertaking media activities in support of the main vectors of Russia’s information policy has been observed. The military policy of  Poland and the activities of the Polish Armed Forces have been and remain targeted by Russian disinformation machine. And now even more, as Poland has just been the host of this year’s edition of the Anakonda military exercise.

The Russian propaganda machine gives a lot of attention to Anakonda, despite the fact that it is a periodic (biennial) and defensive exercise. The aim of this year’s edition – nicknamed ANAKONDA-18 – was to check the possibilities of cooperation between the key command authorities of the Polish Armed Forces and the non-military system as well as the selected elements of NATO command structures. Other aim of the exercise was to integrate initiatives set forth in the decisions of the Warsaw NATO summit. ANAKONDA-18 was as important to the security of Poland, as it was to the to the security of the whole Alliance, with the participation of troops from 10 allied countries and NATO command structures and forces. Around 12,500 soldiers exercised in Poland, while other 5,000 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea. Although the active phase of the exercise, with the participation of the Polish Armed Forces and our Allies, was scheduled for the beginning of November, the Russian propaganda had started pushing its narrative much earlier. Russian media outlets as well as news websites in Poland notorious for spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda had been trying to manipulate the public opinion’s view on the exercise for months in advance. Russia’s tactics remains unchanged. It seeks to threaten, manipulate, disseminate a distorted image of NATO, whitewash its own stance, lash out Polish soldiers and their morale.

A couple of clear lines of narrative can be drawn from the analysis of the activities the Russian propaganda has taken against ANAKONDA-18 so far. Russia sows fear by trying to convince public opinion in Poland that if a conflict between Russia and NATO broke out, our country would be doomed (it threatens us with a nuclear attack, puts forward hypotheses that Poland is at the gunpoint of Russian missile launchers, pushes claims that “Poland will serve as a training ground for US and Russian nukes”). The Kremlin would like to see the Poles feel threatened and bound to fail should there be a confrontation with Moscow. Therefore, Russia portrays Polish Armed Forces as unable to conduct defensive operations, with a low morale and far less trained and skilled than Russian soldiers. In the same vein, NATO is depicted as an “empty” alliance that does not offer any guarantees. The Moscow’s propaganda fabricates negative opinions about the Polish Armed Forces and puts them in the mouths of both Polish and allied soldiers and commanders. At the same time, the capabilities of the Russian army are lauded, in terms of modernisation of the military equipment and the capabilities of troops.

The campaign of fear targeted at Poland is aimed at paralysing the minds and the will to act of our soldiers, but also our countrymen and decisionmakers in order to prevent our country from defending its interests effectively. Russia also tries to spread a false picture of the NATO’s activity on its Eastern Flank, suggesting that the Alliance takes aggressive actions that Russia is forced to neutralize (according to the Kremlin propagandists, the USA and NATO want to clash with Russia, with ANAKONDA-18’s utmost goal being to exercise aggressive operation against Russia and Belarus). The manipulated narrative regarding the Alliance is also pushed on Russia’s domestic ground. The Kremlin wants the Russian society to feel threatened and feeds the myth of a “besieged fortress”. This helps the Kremlin retain the legitimacy of its authoritarian rule in Moscow and integrate the society around the elites in power. The Russian narrative is also about accusing Poland and other NATO members of being irresponsible. If you went by pro-Russian media, you could read that given the number of soldiers and the amount of equipment, ANAKONDA-18 might spark off an armed conflict. The same media presented a manipulated scenario of the exercise and lied about the number of troops. The foretold 100,000 soldiers who were to take part in the exercise and pose a serious threat to Russia, turned out to be just 17,500 in reality. At the same time, Moscow accused the Alliance of covering up its activities and failing to comply with transparency requirements, which are by the way two things Moscow always does. The strategy of manipulating the facts about the activities of NATO has become a permanent tool of Russian propaganda where the Kremlin’s aggressive policy is portrayed as a response to the alleged aggressive approach of the West.

Information campaigns against ANAKONDA-18 are implementations of Moscow’s multidimensional goals. By disseminating its message, Russia seeks to trigger anti-NATO sentiments in Poland, undermine the morale of Polish people and servicemen, diminish their trust in the Allies and military alliances (for example by claiming that due to the cooperation with the USA our country has become vulnerable to attacks by Russia and ISIS, and any guarantees given by NATO are empty), but also to weaken political decisionmakers in order to hamper or even block the abilities of the Polish state to launch a defensive military operation against a potential kinetic military action (Russia suggests that Polish Ministry of Defence is torn by conflicts and that the society does not accept the policy of the current government). Russia undertakes similar actions in other countries of our region, with special focus on Ukraine where Russia makes tensions skyrocket, but also in the Baltic states. By acting in line with the hostile influence theory, Russia strongly believes that it will be able to paralyse the activities of NATO members, particularly on the Alliance’s Eastern Flank, in order to push its own agenda. Russia uses a permanent disinformation campaign to pave the way for further steps, namely intimidation of opponents and immobilisation of defence capabilities.

The aim of information offensives is to get the audience vulnerable to Russian influence to take a distorted picture of reality for granted. To achieve this, Russia uses very simple tools, namely it publishes false information, manipulates the content posted to credible media, and attributes fabricated words to authority figures. Websites that spread pro-Russian propaganda contain interviews with Polish and international military officers, scientists and journalists during which they say things that sound as if they were taken directly from Russian instructions. Except that those interviews either never happened or were fabricated. Opinions presented by the interviewed were tampered with or completely made up. And the fact that those people really exist adds to the credibility of such fake interviews. Not only words, but also images are found in the Kremlin’s propaganda toolkit. Pieces published in support of pro-Russian disinformation come quite often with photos taken at a completely different time and under completely different circumstances.

Another strategy employed by Russian disinformation websites is to discuss texts posted to credible news websites in such a manner that their meaning is grossly distorted. This way pro-Russian disinformation platforms appear more trustworthy, as the readers are not expected to check facts. In Polish media landscape there are also a few official outlets of the Russian propaganda the likes of Sputnik. Although it is fairly easy to determine its affiliations with and links to the Russian state, this Kremlin’s mouthpiece is quite influential among a couple of public figures in Poland who are always ready to give an interview. Consciously or unconsciously, such people provide breeding ground for the Russian propaganda that always makes its own additional use of what they say. The activity of Russia is characterised by long-term goals, with the “endstate” being to permanently distort the way the whole social groups think for the sake of Russian interests. Ultimately, the target audience is supposed to draw conclusions that are in favour of the aggressor and take actions in favour of the Kremlin.

The analysis of news regarding the ANAKONDA-18 exercise spread by Russian propaganda outlets has shown that pro-Russian content is actively promoted. Websites pushing the Kremlin’s point of view ranked quite high in the Internet searches for the hit “ANAKONDA-18” with the use of the most popular search engine in Poland. Those behind the propaganda campaign against the exercise also tried to make it an international issue, promoting their narratives in other languages and injected their propagandist content into online forums and the comments section below articles posted to the mainstream news websites. Such attempts to plant pro-Russian narratives were observed in both right-wing and left-wing news outlets. The mendacious Russian narrative was also disseminated on Internet forums popular among military personnel, the aim being to exercise influence on a particular target group. Russian propagandists would like to see as wide an audience as possible infected with their content. Their activities were supported by the highest Russian political figures, for example the minister of foreign affairs or heads of intelligence services who also attacked the NATO-led exercise in their official statements, not wasting at the same time the opportunity to push an alternative, fake version of developments in Europe.

Russia has been building its capacities to conduct subliminal activities for years. As read in official Russian documents, but also in accordance with the modus operandi of the Russian state, so called “hybrid warfare” and “hostile influence campaigns” make typical tools of the politics of Russia. Launching information campaigns, spreading propaganda, conducting cyber operations including hacking – for Russia all this is just a normal political activity that serves the state’s interests. At the same time, it shows what is at stake. Information offensives against Poland and CEE are not implementations of a plan of a few pro-Russian propagandists. They are actual activities of the Russian state, including its special services, that pursues an aggressive policy towards Western Europe and NATO. Spreading propaganda is yet another way Russia pursues its political goals. Attacking Poland has become a permanent measure employed by Moscow and any change with this respect is rather unlikely. Those attacks are complemented with a set of other activities: getting at Poland’s foreign and history policy (Russia continues to wage a “monument war” on Poland), undermining decisions regarding Polish energy policy, stirring up conflict among the Polish society and between us and our neighbours. Russian operations against Poland will be continued, as now they have gained a strategic importance.

Currently, Poland and the USA are working to strengthen their political, energy and, most of all, military cooperation. An enhanced U.S. military presence in Poland, or maybe even a permanent military base is on the table. This strategic project is of an utmost importance not only to our country, but also to the whole Europe and NATO. If negotiations between Warsaw and Washington conclude successfully, this will be a serious blow to the Russia’s abilities to conduct subliminal operations in CEE. And Poland is the key country for the security of the NATO’s Eastern Flank. In Poland also lies a piece of land that has a special importance to the Alliance – so called Suwalki Gap, the only viable land connection between northern member states and Western Europe. Not to mention the importance of this “bridge” to the transport, logistics, energy supplies, etc. The effectiveness of pursuing NATO’s interests in Europe depends on how much the Alliance protects regions that are the most vulnerable to Russian influence, and Suwalki Gap is such a region. Also Russian experts are aware of the Gap’s importance, which becomes evident as they imply that the presence of NATO forces in the vicinity of this area is aimed at preventing Russia and Belarus from coming to the Kaliningrad Oblast’s rescue, should it need one. Thus, both NATO and Russia consider the Suwalki Gap to be a crucial piece of land for CEE.

With an enhanced presence of its troops in Poland, the USA will contribute significantly to the enhancement to Europe’s resilience to hybrid activities undertaken by Russia. If a decision to set up a U.S. military base in Poland is taken, this will be a major breakthrough for the security of the whole Alliance. For this reason it is highly likely that one of the goals of the current Russian politics towards Poland is to paralyse decision-making processes that could lead to shifting the NATO’s strategic area of defense in the East towards the territory of Poland. Russian are determined to prevent the NATO’s Eastern Flank from increasing its defence capabilities, as this would impair the Kremlin’s operations in Europe. Therefore, the disinformation campaign against “ANAKONDA-18” should be understood as an element of Russian policy against the interests of Poland and the whole Alliance. For Russia, an enhanced defence potential of Poland and U.S. military presence in our region will be a serious operational impediment. For our country and for NATO it should be clear that Russia is playing here a strategic game.

Stanisław Żaryn

_Written by the Spokesman for Poland’s Minister-Special Services Coordinator Text was published in „Sieci“ weekly__